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66-435

28 January 1966

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House

Dear Mac:

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Confirming our brief conversation in Clark Clifford's outer office. who has been conducting a survey of the intelligence effort devoted to warning of an impending military attack, has just about completed his report. Before reaching any final judgments about the adequacy and relevance of the effort, he would like to talk to a few of the ultimate consumers of "warning" information. With this purpose, I will be calling your office to see if you could let us have a little time some time during the week beginning 7 February.

What I think is particularly concerned to find out is what awareness there is on the part of senior policy officials of what is called the warning mechanism; what use it has been in the past, and what use you foresee for it in the future. The assumption on which we are presently operating is that a certain proportion of the intelligence effort should focus exclusively on the collection and evaluation of evidence bearing on the likelihood of a hostile military attack. Policy officials should presumably derive some comfort from confidence that this system is functioning efficiently (if indeed they are aware of its existence). Perhaps the basic question which | would like to ask is what kind of evidence you would expect or hope to have as a basis for

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the kinds of decisions that would have to be taken in seriously escalating situations.

I don't think that a discussion of this subject would necessarily take very long, but would be most appreciative if you spare us whatever time appears to be appropriate.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Toby A. Procs

John A. Bross

JABROSS:ag (28/1/66)

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